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Imaging, Screening, Artificial Intelligence, and the Diagnostic
Dilemma: An Epidemiologist's Response
John C. Lane, MD, PhD*

Issues in imaging, screening, and information processing discussed in a special issue of this Journal
(Henry Ford Hosp Med J 1985;33:65-148) have implicationsfor the decision-making algorithms ofall
clinicians who use those imaging and screening techniques. Epidemiologic and psychological
research show that clinicians, like other professionals, do not obey the laws of conditional probabUity
in their judgments of risk or outcomes under uncertainty. Although physicians cannot be expected to
make complex probabilistic calculations every time they receive the result ofa screening test, teachers
of medicine should present algorithms that would allow the physician-in-training to make efficient use
of information from all sources, including screening tests. In the long run. more formal training of
both clinicians and their teachers in basic epidemiology and biostatistics. especially Bayesian
probability, might yield more efficient use of information from the complex screening systems now
available. (Henry FordHosp MedJ 1986;34:144-6)

special Journal issue on medical imaging (Henry Ford
Hosp MedJ 1985;33:65-148) addressed relatively recent
strategies in screening and medical information processing
which have major importance for the clinician as well as for the
radiologist. Ackerman and Burke's article on artificial intelligence (I) and Keller and Watt's article on mammography as the
standard for imaging and screening for breast carcinoma (2)
both address a more fundamental, underlying problem that all
physicians face. The pediatrics faculty at Henry Ford Hospital
taught this physician, in the course of his clinical training, that
the license to practice medicine is a license to make decisions
with less than complete information. How the physician handles
the incomplete information available to him, then, may be cmcial in effective diagnosis and treatment.
Thus, the basic issue of judgment under uncertainty is possibly the fundamental problem of medicine. This applies to the
surgeon, interaist, gynecologist, psychiatrist, and pathologist as
well as to the radiologist, pediatrician, and epidemiologist. This
paper examines this basic issue of judgment under uncertainty,
with references to literature in epidemiology and the social sciences and to some of the older medical literature, which illustrate some of the difficulties that must be faced both in finding
algorithmic solutions to the diagnostic dilemma and in other applications of medical information processing.
The job of intelligent problem solving in medicine is not mere
listing, sorting, and moving strings of information. Judgment
under uncertainty and the efficient use of decision-making algorithms depend, as Ackerman and Burke (I) noted, on the rales
of conditional probability, including Bayes' theorem. With the
exception of a single lecture in a freshman course in medical genetics, this author was never taught Bayesian probability in
medical school. Bayes' theorem, however, did receive a scant
few pages of attention in the course's text (3). It is not surprising
that Eddy (4) found physicians to be unaccomplished in using
information from screening tests in making diagnoses.
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The example that Eddy used to illustrate clinicians' difficulties in using screening tests to make clinical decisions is the
same example cited by Keller and Watt (2) as the standard for
screening and imaging: the use of mammography in screening
for breast carcinoma. Eddy (4) developed substantial evidence
which shows that physicians tend to erroneously but intuitively
assume that the probability of cancer in a patient with a positive
mammogram [P(calpos)] is approximately equal to the probability of a positive mammogram in a patient with cancer
[P(poslca)]. This will often contradict Bayes' law, which states
that:
P(calpos) =

P( pos Ica) P(ca)
P(poslca) P(ca) -I- P(poslno ca) P(no ca)

As apparent from this equation, the laws of probabilistic decision-making are counterintuitive. Intuitive judgments and decisions made on the basis of those judgments tend to be badly
biased. This is a particular problem when physicians have to use
base rates in relevant sections of the population as the values for
the prior probabilities required in Bayesian analysis. Most physicians do not have a clearly formed idea, either from the epidemiologic literature or from their years of experience of seeing
patients with similar risk factors, what P(ca) and P(pos) might
be in the aforementioned equation.
Kahnemann and Tversky (5,6) have shown that laypersons
tend to ignore base rates and sample sizes in intuitively assessing
risks or probabilities. Later research showed that physicians,
educational psychologists with advanced statistical trainingbusiness school graduates with training in decision theory.
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subtraction angiography (2), the predictive value of imaging
techniques should increase still further
Sufficiently well-developed algorithmic reasoning, where the
decision trees carefully illustrate every potential branch point,
may be used to guide judgment under uncertainty. These strategies have been used in the past in training physicians' assistants, nurse clinicians, and military medical personnel (14).
Use of these algorithms by physicians in clinical medicine has
brought the research diagnostic criteria for mental disorders (15)
into their maturity in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (16).
Because Bayes' theorem is inadequate when reasoning from
incomplete knowledge (about prior probabilities, for example)
and because the complexity of probabilistic calculations increases as multiple hypotheses are tested, it is certainly not reasonable to expect that clinicians will replace their intuitive
clinical judgment with formal probabilistic calculations whenever they use information from screening tests. Physicians'
handling of that information efficientiy will require systematic
protocols of clinical reasoning in which no branch or algorithm
in diagnosis or treatment is neglected as a result of lapses in
clinicians' intuition. When physicians and their coworkers becomefluentwith those protocols, they can then undertake more
formal statistical and epidemiologic reasoning to develop improved strategies for judgment under uncertainty.
Using a classical X-ray mammogram and a patient with a
While it is optimistic to hope that clinicians will be trained to
breast mass who has about a 1% chance of having a malignant
lesion, based on a clinician's experience with women ofsimilar mentally perform complex probabilistic calculations as they
family histories, ages, medical histories, and physical findings, make use of a diagnostic test, it is not unreasonable to expect
that instractors of medicine and surgery will teach algorithms
Eddy (4) used statistics from 1966 (11) to show that though
for the use of screening tests, imaging techniques, and decision
P(poslca) is as high as 0.792, P(caipos) is only approximately
strategies that make the most efficient use possible of all avail8%. Using the same statistics, Eddy also showed that the probability of cancer and a negative test occurring in the same patient able information. Teaching those algorithms may actually
is about 200 times less than the probability of a positive test in a develop "clinical reflexes" and habits that guide physiciansin-training to make efficient judgments under uncertainty.
patient without cancer
If the algorithmic strategies used by clinicians for making
If the prior probability of breast cancer in a woman with a paldecisions under uncertainty need refinement and more use of
pable breast mass is as high as 8%, a positive mammogram
efficient information-processing strategies, it would not be an
would raise the a posteriori P(calpos) to 40%, while P(calneg)
would still be siightiy less than 1%. Under these conditions, optimal strategy to develop artificial intelligence devices (hardmammography could be efficientiy used to guide decisions as to ware or software) which were simply designed to imitate the current habits of an intelligent clinician. The basis for the decisionwhether to biopsy in some patients.
making strategies of the artificial intelligence devices wOl need
More modern data on the validity of mammography would
to be, to the extent possible, free of the biases of intutiiveralesof
further strengthen this argument. In the series by Mygind et al
(12), P(calpos) ranged from 63.2% to 68.2%, and P(poslca) was thumb for risk assessment and decision-making that hinder physicians in effectively using information from complex screening
as high as 91.5%. P(calneg) was only 1.7%, and P(neglca) was
procedures.
only 8.5%. Clearly, mammography has improved in the 20
Such artificial intelligence devices and programs must thereyears since those studies on which Eddy had based his conclufore improve upon and not merely imitate the classically trained
sions. Dodd (13) has also documented the improvements in
clinician's use of probabilistic reasoning. Turing's (17) criterion
mammography which have resulted in better contrast, shorter
of the machine's ability to imitate intelligent communication inexposure time, lower radiation dose, and automated processing.
distinguishable from the clinician's communication will not be
'^Vith these improvements, the trae positive rate in Dodd's resuccessful for the purpose. The machine algorithms wifl need to
view of the recent literature and the Breast Cancer Demonstraset examples for the intelligent clinician and teach the problemtion Detection Projects was 87% to 89%, with a false-negative
rate of 8.6% to 12.8%. Obviously, if Eddy had used these mod- solving approach of probabilistic judgment under uncertainty in
which clinicians have been less than optimally trained.
em statistics, his calculated predictive value of mammography
Would have been higher, and the mammograms could be used
Machines programmable both to learn and to teach are altiore frequentiy to guide decisions as whether or not to biopsy.
ready in development for other applications. Ackerman and
With the currently available techniques of ultrasound, therBurke (I) discussed the use of such machines in quantitatively
""ography, diaphanography, computed tomography, and digital
and probabilistically arriving at a radiographic diagnosis when

, others all tend to depend on the same intuitive rules for
^ jgment under uncertainty which laypersons use in making
|ueir decisions.
A diagnostic or screening procedure is useful only if the clini• ordering the procedure knows how to use the information
'^'hieh it generates. Perhaps it is the lack of training in information processing and probabilistic decision-making that has
aused so many physicians to ignore the information provided
a mammogram. Eddy (4) cited clinicians' confusion between
predictive accuracy (or positive predictive value) of the
mammogram [P(calpos)] and the retrospective accuracy ofthe
mammogram [P(poslca)] as the likely reason for the medical
and surgical literature's insistence that "biopsy is as much a
necessity for confirmation of X-rayfindingsas it is for the confinnation of physical signs" (7). Simdar statements from older
medical literature stated that "any palpable lesion requires verification by excision and biopsy regardless ofthe X-ray findings" (8), and that "while mammography is usually definitive, it
is not a substitute for biopsy" (9) [cf (10)]. If this is the case, a
negative mammogram could never prevent a biopsy of even the
most obviously benign lesion on the mammogram. This would
be tme in spite of the risks and drawbacks which Keller and Watt
(2) cited, including potential disfigurement, the risk of infection, and the costs of the procedure.
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used with some complex imaging techniques. Given this background, Turing's criterion of being able to imitate intelligent (in
this case, clinical) reasoning will probably not be adequate for
the future of medicine. In the short run, simple teaching algorithms which train clinicians in the use of all available information will be an appropriate goal in solving the diagnostic
dilemma.
In the long ran, as the technology of medicine becomes ever
more complex, more formal training of clinicians and their
teachers in probabilistic decision-making and Bayesian and
classical statistics may be required. Such epidemiologic concepts as what a false-positive test and a false-negative test mean
will be important, as will the concepts of a test's sensitivity,
specificity, and positive predictive value. These concepts will
need to be understood by all physicians, not just epidemiologists, and they will need to be used in the processing of
clinical information and in decision-making. Clinicians and
their teachers will need to know base rates (or have them available), know how to interpret 2 x 2 tables, and know something
about risks in populations to function effectively.

Acknowledgment
The author is supported by training grant #5 D33 PEI600003 from the US Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Serrice, Division of Medicine, Tulane University
School of Public Health & Tropical Medicine.

References
1. Ackerman LV. Burke MW. Artificial intelligence and image processing.
Henry Ford Hosp Med J 1985:33:142-5.

146 Henry Ford Hosp Med J—Vol 34, No 2, 1986

2. Keller CE, Watt AC. Mammography: Still the imaging standard. Heim
Ford Hosp Med J 1985;33:82-7.
3. McKusick VA. Human genetics. 2nded. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Han
1969.
4. Eddy DM. Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and
opportunities. In: Kahnemann D, Slovic P, Tversky A, eds. Judgment under
uncertainty; heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Prgj,
1982:249-67.
5. Kahnemann D, Tversky A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychol Rev
1973;80:237-51.
6. Kahnemann D, Tversky A. Subjective probability: Ajudgment of repre.
sentativeness. Cognitive Psychology 1972;3:430-54.
7. Gershon-Cohen J, Borden AGG. Biopsy and mammography. NY State]
Med 1964;64:2751-6.
8. Lesnick GJ. Mammography: A word of caution. NY State J Med
1966;66:2005-8.
9. Egan RL. Fundamentals of mammographic diagnoses of benign and
malignant diseases. Oncology 1969;23:126-48.
10. McClow MV, Williams AC. Mammographic examinations: Ten year
clinical experience in a community medical center Ann Surg 1973;177:616-9.
11. Snyder RE. Mammography: Contributions and limitations in the management of cancer of the breast. Clin Obstet Gynecol 1966;9:207-20.
12. Mygind T, Dorph S, Blichert-Toft M, Lau Pedersen M, Siems.sen O, Kiag
Jacobsen G. Mammography is an objective diagno,stic method. Acta Radiol [Diagnl 1984;25:189-93.
13. Dodd GD. Mammography; State of the art. Cancer 1984;53:652-7.
14. The MEDEX primary health care series. In: Smith RA, ed. Vol 6. Training process manual; curriculum adaptation, instructor preparation, program
management. Honolulu: University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1983.
15. Feighner JP Robins E, Guze SB, Woodruff RA Jr, Winokur G. MunozR.
Diagnostic criteria for use in psychiatric research. Arch Gen Psychiatry
1972;26:57-63.
16. American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders. 3rd ed. Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 1980,
17. Turing A M . Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind
1950;59:433-60.

Screening, Al, and the Diagnostic Dilemma-Un«

J

He:

